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Given recent developments at home and abroad, it is not too early to be drafting a Plan B for Brexit. The
British government and the EU institutions are in danger of putting themselves in diametrically opposed
positions, with little room for manoeuvre when the real negotiations start in a couple of weeks' time. If we
go on like this, the probability is that the Article 50 talks will fail.
What do the British want?
One must assume, for the sake of parliamentary democracy, that when Tory ministers speak out on Brexit
they mean what they say. The nationalistic rhetoric that they have unwisely stoked in the course of the
general election campaign will not be forgotten after the election on 8 June. Prime Minister Theresa May
continues to repeat her ill-judged line that 'no deal is better than a bad deal'. And neither she nor,
disappointingly, the opposition party leaders have put forward viable, coherent plans for British European
relations after Brexit. 
In the unlikely event that Jeremy Corbyn becomes prime minister, nobody would know what to do, in
London or Brussels. We must presume a return of a Conservative government with a workable majority of
loyalist Tory MPs who will ensure the passage of an Article 50 secession treaty. 
That being the case, Brexit minister David Davis (or his successor) will soon square up to the EU's chief
negotiator Michel Barnier at their first negotiating session in Brussels. At this meeting, possibly on 19 June,
the British will be presented with a package of demands from the EU side that has been set out in guidelines
laid down by the European Council on 29 April and in the detailed negotiating mandate of the European
Commission, which were finalised on 22 May.1
As far as the EU is concerned, the first phase of the negotiations will comprise three big problematic items:
citizens' rights, money and the Irish question. The second and more useful phase of Brexit will begin only
after the European Council (of 27) has judged that "sufficient progress" has been made on the first phase. 
If we take him at his word, Mr Davis will have no choice but to reject the Commission's opening sally. He
has already said he does not accept the EU's published criteria for the budgetary settlement. He also
opposes the sequencing of the negotiations that the EU 27 seeks unilaterally to impose, preferring not to
agree the money until there's a trade deal in sight. 
2What the EU wants
The methodology proposed by the EU for the single financial settlement says that the UK shall be
responsible for meeting all its existing and contingent liabilities for the financing of the Union, including
those outside the annual EU budget (such as the European Development Fund).2 The British are expected to
pay for the costs of their withdrawal, including those falling to the relocation of the European Banking
Authority and European Medicines Agency out of the UK.
Other than the return to the Bank of England of the UK's paid-in capital to the European Central Bank, no
provision is foreseen for giving the UK a share of EU assets: as far as the EU is concerned, it is an
autonomous legal entity and not a partnership with shares to be doled out. The UK's financial commitments
to the EU will be controlled by the appropriate EU institutions for as long as it takes to close the accounts.
Figures of between EUR 50bn and EUR 100bn have appeared in the press (about EUR 20bn of which would
relate to meeting Britain's obligations under the current multi-annual financial framework which runs until
the end of 2020).
The EU is demanding that there should be no material change to the position of EU citizens living 
in the UK.3 They (and those who move to the UK before 30 March 2019) are to retain the right of free
movement, and the right to work and of establishment that they would enjoy had the UK stayed a 
member of the EU, including the right to permanent residency after five years, with all attendant 
social security benefits and employment opportunities. Those rights stemming from EU citizenship 
shall be turned under British law into "directly enforceable vested rights for the life time of those
concerned". No discrimination will be permitted against EU citizens by the British authorities on 
the grounds of their nationality. The UK will have to reflect in its law any future changes to the relevant 
EU legislation.
The EU is offering to be flexible with regard to Northern Ireland in that it will try to reconcile the common
travel area agreement between the UK and Ireland with EU law on free movement of people, including
workers, across the new external border of the Union. But as the EU is to treat the post-Brexit UK as a third
country, the retention of a soft border in Ulster for the passage of goods and services would mean the
imposition of a hard border between Ulster and Britain. It is not obvious that the EU side has realised the
practical, political or constitutional consequences of such a proposal for the United Kingdom or for the Irish
Republic or for Anglo-Irish relations. 
The Commission is also mandated to insist on the retention of the judicial authority of the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) over the process of disentanglement. Arrangements will be sought for continued
judicial cooperation in terms of public administration and law enforcement, notably for data protection,
including security data. The EU wants British courts to be able to continue to address the ECJ after 
Brexit on cases relevant to the time of British membership of the Union, and for the UK to remain liable 
for penalties laid down by the Commission or Court as a result of prior or on-going cases at the time 
of withdrawal. 
According to the EU, the UK shall take over and become responsible for all the assets (enriched uranium
and nuclear waste) belonging to Euratom on British territory. 
The EU is to propose a new governance structure to ensure the enforcement of the withdrawal agreement.
No precedent exists for this. A novel institution will have to be created to protect the autonomy of the
Union's legal order, to monitor the phasing out of the UK's rights and obligations, to oversee the continued
rights of EU citizens resident in the UK, to ensure control of the UK's legacy obligations to EU finances, to
cater for the future amendment of EU law in the UK context and, lastly, to manage any events unforeseen
in the secession treaty. 
Where EU law is directly involved the supervisory powers of the Commission and the juridical authority of
the Court of Justice shall be maintained. Where matters of mixed UK and EU competence give rise to legal
disputes, any joint dispute resolution procedure must meet the standards of the ECJ: in so far as the UK
escapes the direct jurisdiction of the ECJ, the UK must nevertheless continue to respect the jurisprudence
of the ECJ. 
Finally, the EU has published its own rules on how it intends to treat the Article 50 process in terms of
transparency.4 For very good democratic reasons, the negotiations will be transparent – and much more
open than is customary in Whitehall. 
How will Britain react?
To the EU 27 and to the EU institutions, the stance they have adopted seems eminently fair and rational,
designed only to achieve the orderly withdrawal of the UK from membership without doing too much
collateral damage to those it leaves behind. The self-confidence of the EU side with its well-marshalled
troops contrasts sharply with the appearance of demoralised shambles on the side of the British. 
The full revelation of the EU's negotiating stance will be portrayed by ardent Brexiteers and Britain's
nationalist press as forcing Britain into a post-colonial relationship. If the EU treats post-Brexit Britain as an
inimical third country, there will be demands at Westminster to return the favour. The EU 27 should accept
that as the UK will not be in the European Economic Area it cannot be expected to accept terms and
conditions similar to those imposed on Norway and Iceland as the price for their membership of the single
market. Nor will the UK agree to be put in the same clientele position as Switzerland. 
We know that Theresa May, in particular, has a strong antipathy against the European Court of Justice. 
HM Treasury, under all governments, loathes the payment of dues to Brussels. As to citizens' rights, being
seen to curb EU migration into the UK is a top political priority for the Conservative government. We
suspect that the prime minister has not yet told her party about the need to install a new formal governance
structure under EU auspices to supervise the withdrawal agreement. Taken together, the area of
disagreement is vast. 
So it is difficult to see how the UK can accept at face value what the EU is now demanding. Objectively
speaking, moreover, it is very much in the UK's national interest that the Article 50 process can move on to
its crucial second phase as fast as possible. There the things that really matter to the British will be
addressed: the arrangements for the financial services industry, the framework for the future relationship
involving a comprehensive free trade agreement and security cooperation – as well as transitional
arrangements which will build a bridge between membership, via Brexit, to a new form of association. 
First skirmish
In order to avoid an early breakdown of the talks, therefore, and to aim to get as good a deal as possible
out of Article 50, Theresa May must be at her most emollient when she attends the next meeting of the
European Council on 22 June. She should be prepared at that early stage to spell out precisely what she
means when she calls for "a deep and special partnership" with the EU after Brexit. She should ask that the
European Council of 27 readies itself to take the decision to move to the second phase of the negotiations
as early as its next scheduled meeting on 19-20 October. 
She should gently remind the 27 leaders of their treaty commitment under Article 8 TEU to "develop a
special relationship" with their new neighbour the UK, "aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good
neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union and characterised by close and peaceful relations
based on cooperation". 
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The prime minister should propose that a flexible transitional period, extended for as long as it takes, would
be in the mutual interest of both parties, and that these transitional arrangements should involve Britain's
continued, albeit temporary membership of the single market and customs union. She should welcome 
the concept of a specific governance structure to manage Brexit, but insist that it be jointly constituted
between the UK and EU. She might even suggest that a report be commissioned to come up with options
for the establishment of the joint transition authority, making recommendations as to its contours, functions
and accountability. 
At his own meeting with Mr Barnier, David Davis (or his successor) should accept the logic of the
sequencing proposed by the EU. He should offer to reciprocate in terms of transparency. He must explain
how the government intends to enact and implement the Great Repeal Bill, transposing the whole acquis
into British law, which will be announced in the Queen's Speech on 19 June. The minister could suggest
that the joint transition authority coordinates the phasing out of Britain's rights and obligations as an EU
member state with the passage of the Bill. 
If he can find good reason to do so, Mr Davis (or his successor) should query the EU's proposed criteria for
the financial settlement. He should insist that any deal for EU citizens in the UK is made reciprocal on an
EU deal for British citizens who choose, against the odds, to stay on in Europe. He should press for a
detailed explanation of the concessions the EU is prepared to make on Ireland. Above all, Mr Davis (if it is
still he) should drop the bluff and bluster that has characterised his performance so far. 
What could possibly go wrong?
This is the counsel of pragmatism, if not of perfection. If the new UK government takes other advice (or
none), the talks will collapse. If Mrs May cannot put country before party, she will be lost. The British have
blundered into the diplomatic maze that is Article 50, and being now trapped in the EU's formal rigid
process they are thereby barred from any joint reflection with the EU 27 on the future of the Union. Quite
frankly, the British need help to find their way out of the labyrinth. 
Meanwhile, Michel Barnier and his team, for their part, are also boxed in by the rigour of the European
Council's guidelines and the tightness of the negotiating directives issued by the General Affairs Council.
Mr Barnier does not have room for manoeuvre if the new UK government bluntly rejects his proposals. In
that event, he would have to return to the European Council for further guidance, and new guidelines would
not be a pretty sight for British eyes. 
President Emmanuel Macron and Chancellor Angela Merkel, not the least of European leaders, have made
it plain that their imperative is the unity, solidarity and reform of the European Union – and that's a
European Union without the British. So if the UK walks away from the Article 50 talks, the EU's clock keeps
on ticking. The EU will complete its preparations to pull out of the UK on schedule at midnight on 29 March
2019. Yet although a disorderly Brexit would hit the UK much harder than the EU, the Union could not
avoid becoming weaker and poorer as a result. In the short term, at least, there would be recrimination,
litigation, political instability and currency volatility. 
A rupture over Article 50 would not, of course, expunge the UK from the geography of Europe. A new cross-
Channel relationship would in the end have to be found. The EU has every political capacity and legal base
it needs in order to negotiate any kind of commercial and political agreement with the UK as a third
country. The Commission is already scoping such a Plan B exercise. The options range from a mere
commercial pact under Article 207 TFEU to a full-blown association agreement under Article 217 TFEU,
including intensive intergovernmental cooperation on matters of security and defence. And once the dust
has settled, the door will always remain open for the UK to launch a fresh application to re-join the EU
under Article 49 TEU. 
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Such a Plan B would be much more costly than a secession treaty hammered out under the terms of Article
50 within the context of an agreed future framework of "deep and special partnership". And a completely
new start for Britain in Europe would be longer in the making over a period stretching way beyond Mrs
May's next tryst with the voters in 2022. But the time to start thinking about Plan B is now. 
Andrew Duff is a former MEP and a visiting fellow at the European Policy Centre (EPC).
5
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6Endnotes
1 The guidelines of 29 April are here: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/04/29-euco-brexit-guidelines/. The 
directives of 22 May are here: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/gac/2017/05/22/?utm_source=dsms-auto&utm_medium=
email&utm_campaign=General+Affairs+Council+(Art.+50)%2c+22%2f05%2f2017
2 The Commission's working paper Essential Principles on Financial Settlement (24 May) is found here: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/financial-settlement-essential-principles-draft-position-paper_en.pdf. A useful
annex lists the 65 EU spending programmes from which the UK will have to be extricated. 
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